Gerdau Group is a Brazilian enterprise that has undergone steady growth since its first acquisition in 1948 of Riograndense steel mill. It has achieved a global position that is internationally recognized. This paper's proposition of five hypotheses to explain the growth of the Gerdau Group is based on Penrose's concept of growth and diversification, Guimarães' concept of the internal restriction of growth, Chandler's concept of strategy-structure, Dunning's competitive advantages relative to the OLI paradigm and the Resource Base View model. The main results found were that the group is a capital unit in the process of growth. This growth is achieved mainly by means of horizontal integration. It also occurs by means of vertical integration. Most of the integration takes place within the original specialization area, the manufacturing of long steel products. The company recently started a process of diversification, expanded towards new markets, and new technological bases. Domestic growth occurred at a higher level than the domestic apparent demand, creating a bottleneck for future growth; thus, exports and FDI appeared as an outlet for the potential growth of the group. As a response to the strategy of growth, the group promoted structural changes, shifting from being a functional organization into becoming a multidivisional one, with increased decentralization but a global system of control developed internally was also present. The growth process was based on resources advantages that were internally created; mainly operational and financial processes constituted the ownership specific asset advantage. Such engendered sustainable advantages were due to its rare resource conditions and the challenge of any imitation. Foreign growth was mainly the result of market seeking, although it also occurred, to a lesser degree, by natural resources seeking, specific assets seeking and productive efficiency seeking, along with support and escape strategies.
become a natural outlet for the potential growth of the firm, such as exporting products or capital (Guimarães 1987, 150) .
As the firm grows because of its competitive, sustainable and differential advantages, the organizational structure must follow such growth, as well as the family culture embedded in such a changing environment. Growing by vertical and horizontal integration and by creating distribution channels requires the management of all these activities; thus, the firm is forced to make the "three-pronged investment" in production, selling and management (Chandler 1972, 14; 1994, 8) . On the other hand, to compete successfully the firm acquires the idiosyncratic ability to recombine internal and external resources as a result of the interaction among family members and the business; during a transgenerational family process, family members acquire a deep level of firm-specific tacit knowledge when working in the business and living among the family from an early age (Chirico and Nordqvist 2010, 4) , which contributes to generate stronger institutional values, according to the interrelations between firm, property rights and management (Esparza Aguilar, Pérez de Lema and Gómez Guillamón 2010, 14) .
To invest abroad, the firm must have some advantages, such as the Dunning's OLI (ownership, location, and internalization) or Verbeke's definition of firm-specific advantage (FSA), internationally transferable or non-transferable (Verbeke 2011, 4) . It is further important to have some strategic objectives (market, resource, efficiency and strategic asset seeking, escape, support and passive investment) 1 , and phases of internationalization (from export to direct foreign investment), which characterizes the path of growth in foreign markets (Dunning 1980, 1 Even though Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, and Un (2015, (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) proposed another set of motives -sell more, buy better, upgrade and escape -, the author maintain the original Dunning's motives, because if we have to change ideas due the change in the world and consolidate all the Dunning's motives into four kinds of motives we can consolidate them into only two motives, derived from the essential equation Dunning recalled as the main reason of entrepreneurs' decisions, that is, to augment the rate of return. The Dunning's proposition (1993, 56-63) helps us in disaggregating the firm pool of strategies to analyzed them.
guarantees (or not) initiatives from the subsidiaries (Birkinshaw 1996, 471; 1997, 207) .
Since the firm-specific advantages, motives, phases, form and subsidiary governance are not predicted, we only can observe them ex post, because of the uncertainty economic dynamic and the existence of randomly events.
From such extant theories, we have constructed five hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: growth of the firm derives mainly from its area of specialization due to the interaction between its technological base and its current market;
Hypothesis 2: growth of the firm occurs in foreign markets when the firm's growth rate is higher than the growth rate of the domestic market;
Hypothesis 3: growth of the firm changes its organizational structure and its values;
Hypothesis 4: internationalization based on barely differentiable product is the result of operational advantages internally created;
Hypothesis 5: internationalization based on barely differentiable product is manly market seeking.
Business history and sources
This paper is a historical microanalysis of a capitalist enterprise in its social economic context (Kula 1974, 139) , that is, a business history of an individual firm (Barbero 2003, 318 ) with a limited scope based on the theoretical approach discussed in the previous section. It is based on Gerdau's institutional history (Gerdau 2001) , from which it ispossible to extract relevant data about several aspects of Gerdau's temporal evolution.
We have selected the following unit of analysis (and its variables): technological base (productive technologies), the current market (pool of market areas), the growth process by horizontal and vertical integration (acquisition, merger, backward and forward integration), financial strategy (borrowing, stock market, relations with bankers), organizational restructuring process (organization structure) and subsidiaries mandates (mandate gain, mandate development, mandate loss), institutional values (family creeds), innovative and quality strategies (product specification, durability, line of products, brand, commercial channels), and the relation between the firm and state-owned institutions (fund searching).
The recent temporal evolution is based on the published reports, especially the Annual Report and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's Form 20-F. Specific historical aspects, such as the evolution of financial strategy, national expansion and internationalization, are documented by means of two interviews conducted with key employees. Three other interviews available in the company's Documentation Center, were also utilized. The balance sheets submitted since 1969 to the Security and Exchange Commission of Brazil, in Rio de Janeiro were used as a source for the financial and production data. Finally, some data for the enterprise were collected from monographs by graduate programs in Brazil.
The growth of Gerdau Group in the Brazilian domestic market
The Riograndense steel mill in Porto Alegre, one of the smallest steel factories in Brazil in the forties (Baer 1970, 90) , was a minimill 2 . Its technological base in that period was composed of a electric furnace for scrap fusion and a conventional casting and rolling system. Both systems were operated manually. Its technological dependency was related to the geographic location of scrap. The location of raw material supplies determined where the factory would be located.
Riograndense Steel Mill's current market was thus the mechanical, construction and farming industries. These markets were the targets of its main products, such as bars, rebars and wires.
The Nail Factory Hugo Gerdau acquired the steel mill in 1948, with funds from the enterprise, the Gerdau family itself and from loans (Gerdau 2001, 14) . After the acquisition, one of the first measures taken was to adjust the factory to build a profitable cost structure (Oliveira 1999).
The factory operated at a technological lag. The steel mill processed 3 tons per charge from the electric furnace, 11 thousand tons of raw steel/year using a 3-megawatts electric transformer (Gerdau 2001, 19) when furnaces and electric transformers with fivefold capacity had been available since the beginning of the twentieth century (Madias 2014, 271) . Conventional casting, with liquid steel pouring into molds and subsequently demolded, and the rolling system, followed the technological parameters of this period. However, the main problem of the steel mill was the operational process, which was resolved by closing the factory for six months (Oliveira 1999). The need for wire rod supply for the manufacturing of nail had to wait for a medium-term solution -the installation of a drawing mill -in the early fifties. The technical the city of Sapucaia do Sul. For six years, it was possible to construct a minimill with a more modern steel mill, a continuous casting and a much more modern rolling mill (Gerdau 2001, 24-6) . The electric furnace was capable of producing five tons per charge, producing 18 thousand tons annually. Despite that, it was not able to exploit the scale economy already existing in the industry capable of producing twice that capacity (Walden and Marincek 1957, 56) . The rolling mill was a tandem type, which meant that it had a continuous cold rolling. The gains in productivity and quality were only achieved, however, by substituting the continuous casting with the conventional one. This was considered an early adoption of this technical progress, since the fact that back in the sixties, this system only accounted for three percent of the global rolling process (Palacio Reparaz and Arana Bilbao 2002, 118) . This new mill created an unprecedented experience of a greenhouse steel mill construction, that embedded a singular characteristic of the group central board: the implementation of the best technologies and methods. This factory mill would still receive the investment capable of five times the steel production that, added to the Farrapos mill production, favored the enterprise to overcome the level of 100 thousand tons produced in 1967 (Vieira 2007, 339) .
After one and a half decades of steel mill operation under new management, the enterprise advanced its expertise in the area of specialization of long steel with state of art technology in The growth of the Riograndense mill that took place over the course of a decade and a half under the control of the Gerdau family was concentrated regionally in the southern part of the country, although the firm possessed distribution centers in the northern, northeastern and southeastern regions of the country (Rosenfeld 1999) . The second half of the fifties was the period that saw a national growth spurt in infrastructure and industrialization due to Brazilian president Kubitschek's "Target Plan", which concentrated the national economic dynamics in the southeastern region of the country (Lessa 1982, 27; Cano 1983, 227) . At the same time, the economy in the Southern state of Rio Grande do Sul saw a reduction in growth with the end of capital accumulation based on small enterprise under the new framework of integration of the national market (Herrlein Jr 2002, 653) . For the company, the strategy of growth meant the achievement of productive units in larger markets, be it by greenhouse or acquisition. The business opportunity in these markets appeared randomly.
The mini-mill technology base was instrumental in accessing local markets employing small productive units and utilizing the local supply of scrap. This approach allowed for the reduction of production costs related to a large-scale production unit by utilizing local scrap collection as opposed to transporting scrap from all around the country. 
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"forced march" (Castro 2004, 30) . Major infrastructure works were in process, such as the hydroelectric power plant of Itaipu (1975 Itaipu ( -1982 , São Paulo subway system (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) , the first line), the Rio-Niteroi bridge (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) , among others. This would expand the market for long steel in the Brazilian economic center (Vargas 1994, 178) . In this context, in five years, the company acquired three industrial mills in smaller regional markets in the northeastern and in the southern areas of the country. A larger scale steel mill, the Guanabara steel company (Cosigua), capable of producing 250 thousand tons annually was built between 1971 and 1974, in the national economic center of the time, Rio de Janeiro. That was ten times the output of the Sapucaia factory. The first successful attempt at stablishing a joint enterprise for the business was achieved with an association with the German Thyssen, who brought the credit for financing the project. During this expansion period towards the Brazilian economic center, the fourth generation of Gerdau-Johannpeter family fully entered the steel business; construction of the greenhouse of Cosigua was a formative learning experience for the four brothers that would be at the helm of the enterprise growth until the end of the century. By then, the company had already become a group, the Gerdau Group (Gerdau 2001, 42-66) .
During the eighties, when the Brazilian economy stagnated, the privatization of the national steel industry followed the international trend of privatizations. This opened opportunities of growth for the group that extended for the nighties. The group faced great competitors, such as Nippon Steel and Arcelor (Paula 1997, 94; Crosseti and Fernandes 2005, 157n) . It took advantage of privatization, enlarging its horizontal integration to consolidate its regional market share in the northeast and south, expanding its market share in the southeast. Gerdau's current market was still increased within its area of specialization, long steel products, achieving the production level of two million tons by the late eighties (Gerdau 2001, 171-187) . The great shift In the late nineties, after achieving the global production level of five million tons of crude steel (Vieira 2007, 339) , the Group's growth in the national market was almost none, with the exception of the acquisition of Villares Steel, and the horizontal and vertical integration in the integrated steel sector. Villares was a major special steel producer in Brazil. It was indirectly acquired when its owner, the Spanish Sidenor, was purchased (Lannes 2013, 19) . In 2000, Gerdau Group was responsible for half the national production of long steel, its core business.
It was about to monopolize the domestic special steel market and it started to take on the competition in the national flat steel market, which was 70% bigger than the long steel market (Gerdau 2000b, 17; WSA 2002, 54-55 (Gerdau 2001, 209; 2002c, 6 ).
The growth strategy that propelled a single steel mill in Porto Alegre to become a vertical integrated steel conglomerate required a structural change. For two and half decades, the group possessed a centralized management structure, run by executive committee where the GerdauJohannpeter family members and hired executives participated. During the 1970s expansion, new legislation concerning stock corporations was passed -Law 6404, of December 15, 1976, which made it obligatory for the company to have a management committee with deliberative attributions. It also imposed the separation of the strategic management and the executive management. These, growth and law, pushed for a more decentralized organization, more regionalized and more concentrated on the productive apparatus. To that end, the group established several boards: a) the administrative board for the strategy functions and pertinent deliberations, b) the board of directors that would perform operational work and be responsible for the three regional centers -south, southeast and northeast -and c) the management of Gerdau 2001 Gerdau , 2001a Gerdau -2010a ; compiled by the author The conglomeration enlargement in the eighties changed the management organization; the emphasis on the productive units, that is, in the operational processes, was modified by an emphasis on the market, that is, focusing on sales channels, because of the group's capacity to Since the group needed to learn, the management of the acquired firm was completely controlled by the headquarters, a center-controlled mandate. It was a micro steel factory, with a seven thousand tons of steel production capacity, run annually by an obsolete technology. The former capacities acquired by the group: technical reforms, technological modernization and goods improved were transferred to this first FDI, seeking for the results with this experiment, characterizing internationally transferable FSAs that would create another FSA that would also be transferable later. This highly educational experience shaped the executives who would be involved in the acquisition of a Canadian steel factory, an entry gate for the North American 
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I characterize such a phase as a learning phase, since it was during this period that Brazilian executives learned different styles of management of the already known technological base and established a relationship with distinct workforce, managing cultural and union conflicts, more than merely seeking market; it is more appropriately characterized as strategic-asset seeking, especially in Canada, sharing capabilities with native employees 4 .
When the Group acquires assets in South America and Canada in the early nineties, Gerdau had a great steel market at its disposal. The apparent use of crude steel in America in 1990 was 143 million tons and it was estimated that nearly 37% was the long steel demand. Gerdau would reach a production level of 2.4 million tons that year (WSA 1993, 54; 1998, 78-79; Vieira 2007, 339) . The long steel market in North America was seventeen times of the company's production; South America's was five times bigger. By the end of the century, the group would expand strongly into these two geographical areas, focusing its expansion in the United States' economy, since its biggest market in the Americas would allow for a greater diversity in the forms of growth.
The Latin American expansion coincided with the strong growth of the regional apparent steel demand since the late eighties. The demand jumped from 15 million tons in 1989 to 35.7 million tons in 2000 (WSA 1991, 41; 2001, 85) , more than doubling in size in one decade. The group succeeded in entering in three South American economies with a market share above 15% before its great global competitors: Chile, Colombia and Peru. In the other economies, Argentina, México and Venezuela, that had an apparent annual steel demand level above three million tons, the entry was marginal. The market share in those markets did not surpass five size of its market, the possibility of diversification to other technological bases and other market areas became reality.
Before this event, a fortuitous experience caused the group to ingress in a new market area and bring to the company a totally new system of governance, characterizing this FDI as specificasset investment, not sought. Manitoba Rolling Mills (MRM) was a Canadian mini-mill in a market niche of long steel for the rail industry, agricultural machinery and elevator guides. The group was unaware of the existence of MRM up to this point. It was a medium scale factory, modern, with good financial indicators. Despite that, its executives did not see how competition could be faced without the support of a great steel group; thus, in 1995 MRM executives reached out to Gerdau with a proposal that their assets be acquired by the group. Gerdau incorporated yet one more management system and, since MRM produced such positive outcomes, the group granted plain mandatory to local managers. The group would deal simply with the human resources interchange for the system integration with the headquarters system (Gerdau 2001, 201; Sommer, 2006) . With this plain mandate, Gerdau MRM was established in 1995 and in 2000 entered into two joint ventures for market niches, the trailer I rebar and guide elevators (Gerdau 2002b, 49) 5 . Technological route: BF-Blast furnace; BOF-Basic oxygen furnace; EAF-Electric arc furnace; R-Rolling; TSCThin slab caster Forms of investment: A-Acquisition; G-Greenfield; JV-Joint venture; M-Merger. Sources: Gerdau 2001 Gerdau , 2001a Gerdau -2010a Gerdau , 2001b Gerdau -2010b compiled Sidenor, enabling its entry into the European market. The Group dominated the special steel market share in Brazil by acquiring Sidenor's assets. In 2007, the group started operating in India, through a joint venture process (Lannes 2014, 158) .
The 2008 global economic crisis put a brake on the group's expansion, when the group were the 13 th largest steel enterprise in the world (Table 3 ). The reduction in sales revenues and the reduction in the return on investment would lead not only to a reduction in investment, but also an increase in disinvestment. In nearly three decades of internationalization by FDI, its production grew seventeen times main objectives were to simplify internal processes and structures, to modernize the group's though the Group has merged and engaged in joint ventures a number of times, most of its growth is mainly attributed to acquisitions, revealing the importance given by this family group to maintaining total control of its capital management. Since the nineties, the group has added special steel and flat steel to its specialization area. The former has enabled them to ingress the international market and the latter the domestic market. Whereas the technological base was little impacted by the implementation of special steel production, it was the flat steel production that completely changed the productive base. It was the implementation of integral steel production that would increase its verticalization. Despite its accelerated diversification to other specialization areas, the original area still maintained 70% of the group productive capacity (Gerdau 2016b, 49) 
(Hypothesis 1).
To each step in the growth strategy corresponded a necessary change in the administrative structure and values. The company shifted from functional to multidivisional structure, exercising a global system of control that would allow more decentralized decision making, resulting recently in the family decision to depart from positions in direct management. The group strategy to incorporate distinct management systems from acquired firms contributed to the separation of capital property and management which allowed distinct mandatory grades to subsidiaries, monitored by the global system of control. Furthermore, the firm's values were upgraded, despite the fact of contradictions with workforce (Hypothesis 3).
The group expansion into the global steel market was possible because of internal cumulative competitive advantage created in the process. Some of these advantages seemed to be the source of operational and financial management competitiveness. The first allowed for the creation of operational know-how expertise in the original steel specialization area, manly in process procedure. The latter allowed for access to alternative sources of funds, that is, the group went Since long steel is a product with low possibilities of differentiation, the firm sought markets to increase production scale. In some situations, it did seek natural resources, withdrawing from those markets when the expected results were not produced. Colombia was one of those markets. In United States, it sought support and specific assets. Spain included seeking specific assets, but it was later discarded. Some assets located in Peru and in Argentina helped improve operational efficiency however these weren't predominant factors in their acquisition (Hypothesis 5).
